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CROSSING THE FINAL BORDER: SECURING EQUAL GENDER
PROTECTION IN IMMIGRATION CASES
Michelle L. Sudano*
Power without justice is soon questioned. Justice and power must
be brought together, so that whatever is just may be powerful, and
whatever is powerful may be just.
—Blaise Pascal1
INTRODUCTION
Consider two men, both Mexican immigrants, both convicted of importing
marijuana to the United States and both sentenced as drug offenders. The men are
similarly situated in all important regards; the men are the same age, were both born
in Mexico, and were brought to the United States when they were very young by a
single, unwed parent. Both men were raised in the United States, but neither man for-
mally applied for United States citizenship. The only relevant difference between the
men is which parent possesses United States citizenship. In the first case, the offender’s
mother is a United States citizen; in the second case, the offender’s father is a United
States citizen. It would seem to most observers that the offenders’ parentage should
not matter to their sentences as long as both men were convicted of the same crime
under the same circumstances. Here however, the stories of the two men diverge. The
first offender, whose mother possesses United States citizenship, is sentenced for his
crime, serves his time, and is released. The second man, whose father possesses United
States citizenship, is sentenced for his crime, reported to immigration authorities, and
deported. Though this seems inequitable and arbitrary, it is the current state of immi-
gration law in the United States. The first offender is hypothetical; the second offender
is Rueben Flores-Villar.2
Although there was early hope that the Supreme Court would overturn Flores-
Villar’s deportation order,3 his case continued a tradition of Supreme Court decisions
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2013; B.A., University of Nevada, 2009.
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1 BLAISE PASCAL, THOUGHTS ON RELIGION AND OTHER SUBJECTS 265 (Edward Craig
trans., 1829).
2 Rueben Flores-Villar was the plaintiff in the most recent challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1409
(2006), a statute which allows for the above-described scenario. See United States v. Flores-
Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d without opinion, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
3 See, e.g., Sandra S. Park, In Flores-Villar v. U.S., Court Should Overturn Law That
Discriminates Against Fathers, ACLU BLOG RTS. (Nov. 8, 2010, 3:43 PM), http://www
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affirming Congress’s power to regulate facially discriminatory immigration statutes.4
Courts have been reluctant to interfere with immigration proceedings due to Congress’s
high level of discretion in international and political matters.5 Though the Court does
undeniably owe a high level of deference to Congress’s plenary control over matters
such as immigration law, this is not an absolute grant of power6—when Congress
passes immigration laws that infringe upon other constitutional protections, the Court
should retain the power to intervene.7 The Court’s continued inaction could lead to
a judicial system that does not use its power to ensure the just outcome in all cases.8
The constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1409,9 the law allowing the disparate out-
come described above, has been heard by the Supreme Court three times and the re-
sult has always been the same: the Court recognizes that the statute does produce an
inequitable outcome for one class of potential United States citizens, but the Court
.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/flores-villar-v-us-court-should-overturn-law-discriminates
-against-fathers.
4 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (affirming Congress’s ability to impose
stricter standards on children born out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but not citizen mothers);
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (affirming Congress’s ability to impose stricter stan-
dards on children born abroad out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but not citizen mothers, in order
to prove paternity); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (affirming Congress’s ability to enact
a law that excludes the relationship between an illegitimate child and his natural father—as
opposed to his natural mother—in granting special preference immigration status to the child
of a lawful resident).
5 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–66 (1972) (“‘Over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of
aliens.” (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))).
6 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (“The power of Congress in
[regulating commerce] is broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates
no express constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court, going back almost to the
founding days of the Republic, not to interfere.” (emphasis added)). This statement implies that
the Court reserves the right to intervene if a law is unconstitutional.
7 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970) (“As broad as the congressional enforce-
ment power is, it is not unlimited. Specifically, there are at least three limitations upon Congress’
power to enforce the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments. . . . Congress may only ‘enforce’
the provisions of the amendments and may do so only by ‘appropriate legislation.’ Congress has
no power under the enforcement sections to undercut the amendments’ guarantees of personal
equality and freedom from discrimination.”).
8 Immigration scholar Stephen Legomsky believes it is particularly important to ensure
just outcomes in the immigration context, because “[a]n immigration law acts as a mirror. It
reflects the qualities that we value or reject in others. For the same reason, immigration policies
supply a litmus test. They offer the world a glimpse into our souls, an insight into what we truly
believe.” Stephen E. Legomsky, Immigration Policy from Scratch: The Universal and the
Unique, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 366 (2012).
9 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006). In addition to 8 U.S.C. § 1409, this Note also considers 8
U.S.C. § 1401 (2006), which lays out the general requirements for parental transmission of
citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(e).
2013] CROSSING THE FINAL BORDER 959
reasons that the justifications for 8 U.S.C. § 1409 are substantially related to the
statute’s outcomes.10 Additionally, the Court notes the rich and voluminous history
of decisions relating to immigration law.11 Existing immigration jurisprudence has
created a seemingly insurmountable stare decisis problem that prevents the Court from
intervening in Congress’s plenary immigration power to overturn 8 U.S.C. § 1409.12
Numerous journal articles have predicted or advocated for a new judicial interpreta-
tion of the statute.13 Though the articles generally make persuasive points, the Court
has affirmed and reaffirmed its point despite any logic or social factors to the contrary.14
The blatant gender discrimination in 8 U.S.C. § 1409 has caused authors to continue
to write on the subject, because the outcome seems fundamentally wrong and unfair
to so many. This Note attempts to make the argument that cases such as Flores-Villar
should be evaluated in accordance with family law principles as opposed to immigra-
tion law alone. This, however, creates its own set of problems. Namely, how should
courts go about reconciling the traditionally federal issue of immigration law with
family law, which has been left solely to the discretion of the states?
Part I of this Note provides a brief description of U.S. immigration statutes and
changes thereto over time, looking specifically at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 and 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of the relevant Supreme Court cases dealing
with 8 U.S.C. § 1409 and looks at how gender discrimination principles have been ap-
plied to three primary cases: Miller v. Albright,15 Nguyen v. INS,16 and United States v.
Flores-Villar.17 Part III of this Note discusses how immigration laws conflict with equal
protection provisions and evaluates why immigration jurisprudence is an improper ve-
hicle for the Court to overturn 8 U.S.C. § 1409, despite its inequitable outcome. Part IV
considers the history of gender discrimination in family law and proposes family law
as a vehicle that could lead the Court to a more careful scrutiny of the gender stereo-
types at work in 8 U.S.C. § 1409. Part IV also considers changes in the social landscape
and the development of new ideas about fathers’ fundamental rights and discusses why
these changes should lead to the Court reconsidering its position in future 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409 proceedings.
10 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998);
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
11 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58–59; Miller, 523 U.S. at 428–29; Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792–96.
12 See infra Part III.C.
13 See, e.g., Kif Augustine-Adams, Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of
Citizenship and Nation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 93 (2000); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration
Law and the Principle of Congressional Plenary Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Lica
Tomizuka, The Supreme Court’s Blind Pursuit of Outdated Definitions of Familial Relation-
ships in Upholding the Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1409 in Nguyen v. INS, 20 LAW &
INEQ. 275 (2002).
14 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
16 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
17 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d without opinion, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
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I. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS IN IMMIGRATION LAW
In order to understand why Flores-Villar and its predecessors were resolved as
they were, it is important to understand the underlying immigration statutes, as well
the policy implications of such statutes. Certainly, the primary responsibility for creat-
ing immigration laws falls on Congress.18 However, as with any other substantive area
of law, the judicial branch retains the responsibility for ensuring that the text or appli-
cation of a law does not fall astray of constitutional values.19 The Court failed to do
this by affirming, without opinion, the decision in Flores-Villar.20 Though unjust from
an equal protection standpoint, the decision was required in light of immigration law,
suggesting that immigration law is no longer the appropriate lens for viewing cases
such as Flores-Villar.
A. Citizenship and Naturalization as Defined in the United States
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a citizen as “[a] person who, by either birth or
naturalization, is a member of a political community, owing allegiance to the com-
munity and being entitled to enjoy all its civil rights and protections; a member of the
civil state, entitled to all its privileges.”21 Nationality is defined as “[t]he relationship
between a citizen of a nation and the nation itself, customarily involving allegiance by
the citizen and protection by the state; membership in a nation.”22 Though technically
the terms have different meanings, the terms nationality and citizenship are generally
used interchangeably,23 as they are in this Note.
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights requires that every person born
have a nationality and prohibits arbitrary deprivation of nationality thereafter.24 The
Declaration, however, does not mandate the process through which citizenship must
transfer to a child. Citizenship can be transmitted to a child through two methods: jus
sanguinis (Latin: “right of blood”)25 or jus soli (Latin: “right of the soil”).26 If a child
18 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .”).
19 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the principle of judicial
review and the Court’s ability to strike down unconstitutional laws).
20 Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (holding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409 do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause).
21 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (9th ed. 2009).
22 Id. at 1123.
23 See, e.g, id. (“[Nationality] is often used synonymously with citizenship.”).
24 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Dec. 10, 1948).
25 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 941 (“The rule that a child’s citizenship
is determined by the parents’ citizenship. Most nations follow this rule.”).
26 Id. (“The rule that a child’s citizenship is determined by place of birth. This is the U.S.
rule, as affirmed by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.”).
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is not born with the citizenship of the United States, the only way to obtain that
citizenship is through the naturalization process.27 Thomas Janoski lays out a good
summary of the possible paths to naturalization:
Naturalization is the acquisition of citizenship . . . (2) by decree—
going through varied naturalization processes; (3) by declaration—
declaring oneself a citizen on the basis of marriage or adoption by
a citizen; or (4) by being born to foreign parents on national soil.28
Comparing the methods above with the facts of the cases discussed in this Note, it is
clear that only the second is viable for parties such as Flores-Villar. Since the cases
this Note discusses deal exclusively with children born on foreign soil to United States
citizen parents, the facts of the cases do not fit in with the fourth method above, but
are actually an opposite situation; as the parties involved are the natural children of
United States citizens, and still children at the time their citizenship status is relevant,
adoption and marriage under the third method are also not options. Specifically, none
of the cases this Note discusses consider the mechanisms for transmission of citizenship
by adoption because the challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1409 only arises when discussing the
right of natural parents to transmit citizenship. Similarly, as 8 U.S.C. § 1409 deals with
parental transmission of citizenship, it also does not extend to marital transmission.29
Thus, the only way the children affected by 8 U.S.C. § 1409 can gain United States
citizenship is through the second method of transmission: decree. Gaining citizen-
ship through decree requires complying with statutory requirements established by
Congress.30 These immigration and naturalization statutes have changed markedly
over time, in response to changing social and economic realities facing the nation.31
B. General Development of Immigration and Naturalization Law
United States immigration law has its foundation and beginning in the Constitution,
as an area of law to be regulated exclusively by Congress.32 Though Congress retains
plenary control over immigration matters, how Congress has chosen to regulate this
branch of law has changed over time. Congress, for its part, has made numerous
changes to immigration law in response to our changing views on race, gender and
27 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution . . . contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only:
birth and naturalization.”).
28 THOMAS JANOSKI, THE IRONIES OF CITIZENSHIP 27 (2010).
29 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006).
30 See generally infra Part I.B.
31 See infra Part I.B.
32 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.”).
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equality.33 However, Congress has not always kept pace with changes in societal
views.34 The result is an area of law that is fractured, inconsistent and based on out-
dated gender stereotypes.35 The following sections discuss the statutory development
of 8 U.S.C. § 1409 over the past forty years.
1. Early Immigration Laws and Regulations
Initially, persons brought to the United States through the slave trade were not
subject to immigration laws, but rather importation laws.36 In the early twentieth
century, Congress passed a law stating “[t]hat any American woman who marries
a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband.”37 In 1922, Congress passed a
law that automatically gave a child the citizenship of his or her father.38 United States
history is fraught with other examples of racist,39 discriminatory,40 and otherwise
restrictive41 laws dealing with immigration and naturalization of citizens. However,
the important thing to note about all of these examples is that, as opinions changed,
so too did the laws. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1409 has changed, the changes have not been
important or timely enough to reflect the changing social schema of immigration and
family law. Thus, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 strikes many as anachronistic or lacking in sound
legal justification.42
2. Changes to 8 U.S.C. § 1401 and 8 U.S.C. § 1409 Over Time
When it was passed in 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 required a married citizen parent
to be in the United States for a minimum of ten years, at least five of those years after
33 See infra Part I.B.1.
34 See infra Part IV.A.
35 See infra Part IV.A.
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (leaving control for importation and naturalization of slaves
to Congress).
37 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 307 (1915) (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534,
34 Stat. 1228, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 3960 (1907)).
38 In re Citizenship Status of Minor Children, 25 F.2d 210, 210 (D. N.J. 1928) (“Those born
here are citizens of the United States, under the Constitution, regardless of the allegiance of
their parents. Those born abroad will, as heretofore, take the nationality of their fathers.”).
39 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888)
(limiting the annual number of immigrants from certain Asian nations). The constitutionality
of the Chinese Exclusion Act was heard by the Court in several cases and upheld on the grounds
that it did not violate any existing treaties with the Chinese government. See, e.g., Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
40 See, e.g., Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798); Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1
stat. 570 (1798); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 stat. 596
(1798). These acts are collectively known as “The Alien and Sedition Acts.”
41 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477 (preventing convicts and prostitutes
from immigrating to the United States).
42 See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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attaining the age of fourteen, in order to transmit his or her U.S. citizenship to a child
born outside of the United States.43 This was subsequently amended in 1986 to require
the married, citizen parent to be in the United States for a minimum of five years, at
least two years of which were after attaining the age of fourteen, in order to transmit
citizenship.44 When dealing with married couples, these regulations apply equally re-
gardless of whether the parent transferring U.S. citizenship is the child’s mother or
the father.45
As shown above, the relevant sections of the United States Code dealing with
differing rights based on parentage of the immigrant have become more lax over time.
However, changes to the law do not retroactively apply to people applying for United
States citizenship; the law that was in effect at the time the person in question was born
is the law that governs his or her subsequent immigration proceeding.46 This rigidity
means that parties, such as Flores-Villar, may continue to fall through the cracks for
years after an immigration law has been changed.
Despite creating a marriage-dependent set of rules for transmission of citizenship,
Congress recognized that not all children born outside the United States to a citizen
parent would be born in wedlock.47 Thus, Congress created separate provisions for
unwed citizen mothers and unwed citizen fathers. Rather than being required to spend
43 Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 235–36 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (2006)). The Act read, in part:
(a) The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States
at birth:
. . . .
(7) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United
States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien,
and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such
a person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying pos-
sessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least
five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years . . . .
Id. § 301(a)(7).
44 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006). The statute reads in part:
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
. . . .
(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States
and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the
other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person,
was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for
a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which
were after attaining the age of fourteen years.
Id. § 1401(g).
45 See id.
46 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 72 (2001).
47 8 U.S.C.S. Prec. § 1421 (“Special rules apply when determining citizenship for those
born outside the country to U.S. citizen parents. . . . They have included . . . special rules for
children born out of wedlock outside the U.S. and certain provisions for children born in
U.S. territories.”).
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at least five years in the United States, unwed mothers only need to be in the United
States for a continuous period of one year in order to transmit citizenship to a child.48
If the citizen parent is an unwed father, he must meet additional requirements and take
affirmative steps before he is able to transmit his U.S. citizenship to his child; in ad-
dition to meeting the physical presence requirement set out for married parents, an
unwed U.S. citizen father must also prove a blood connection to the child, agree to
provide support for the child and take steps to legitimize paternity before the child
reaches eighteen years of age.49 These requirements are more onerous than those placed
on mothers, wed or unwed.50 The gendered nature of the distinction between 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) opens the statutes up to scrutiny on the basis of
gender discrimination.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE LAW ADDRESSING 8 U.S.C. § 1409
The Court has addressed three separate challenges to 8 U.S.C. § 1401 and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409 on only marginally different facts, suggesting that the law is not settled in an
adequate way.51 The most recent case, Flores-Villar, was argued in the 2010 session.
48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c). The subsection states:
Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a person
born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wed-
lock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his
mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time
of such a person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically
present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a
continuous period of one year.
Id.
49 Id. § 1409(a). The subsection reads:
(a) The provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (g) of section 1401 of
this title, and of paragraph (2) of section 1408 of this title, shall apply as
of the date of birth to a person born out of wedlock if—
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is
established by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time
of the person’s birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide
financial support for the person until the person reaches the
age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years—
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the
person’s residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person
in writing under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adju-
dication of a competent court.
Id.
50 See id. § 1409(c).
51 See generally Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420
2013] CROSSING THE FINAL BORDER 965
A. Background Case—United States v. Flores-Villar
On June 13, 2011, the Supreme Court, in a four-to-four deadlock and without
opinion, affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Flores-Villar.52 Ruben
Flores-Villar was born in Tijuana, Mexico on October 7, 1974, to unwed parents.53
Flores-Villar’s mother was a non-U.S. citizen and his father, Rueben Trinidad
Floresvillar-Sandez, was a United States citizen.54 Flores-Villar was brought to the
United States by relatives shortly after his birth and was raised in San Diego,
California.55 In 1997, Flores-Villar was arrested for importation of marijuana and
later charged with entering the United States illegally and scheduled for deportation.56
At a subsequent deportation hearing, Flores-Villar appealed his deportability, arguing
that he was a United States citizen.57 Under Flores-Villar’s argument, he was a citizen
because his father and paternal grandmother were U.S. citizens who had spent enough
time in the United States to transmit their U.S. citizenship to him, even though Flores-
Villar himself had never taken affirmative steps to establish his U.S. citizenship.58 The
Ninth Circuit found that the then-applicable version of the immigration statute, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409, did not allow Floresvillar-Sandez to transmit his U.S. citizenship to Flores-
Villar.59 Thus, the deportation proceeding against Flores-Villar was allowed to stand.60
As Flores-Villar illustrates, the hypothetical drug offender trying to gain citizen-
ship through his mother would be bound by his mother’s ability to satisfy the require-
ments of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c), not 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).61 An unwed mother transmitting
citizenship needs to be physically present in the United States for one year, while an
unwed father needs to be present for five years (two of those years must occur after at-
taining fourteen years of age).62 An unwed father also has to take additional affirmative
(1998); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d without opinion,
131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
52 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
53 Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994–95.




58 Id. at 998–99.
59 Id. at 993, 998–99. Technically, Floresvillar-Sandez fell through a gap in 8 U.S.C. § 1409
that made him ineligible to transfer his citizenship to Flores-Villar. The statute required a father
to be in the United States for five years after attaining the age of fourteen. See id. at 993 (citing
8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7); 1409 (1974)). Floresvillar-Sandez was only sixteen when Flores-Villar
was born, so it was physically impossible for him to have been present in the United States for
long enough to meet the statute’s requirements. Id. at 994, 998. See supra Part I.B.2 for an
explanation of the statute applicable when Flores-Villar was born and its subsequent versions.
60 Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 993–94.
61 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2006) (using the word “father” four times and never using the
word “mother”).
62 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
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steps before he is able to transmit citizenship to a child.63 In the situation described
above, the hypothetical offender would be able to gain U.S. citizenship where Flores-
Villar could not. Thus, two men, identically situated, except for the happy accident of
their parentage, receive drastically different outcomes under the application of U.S.
immigration law.
The sex of Flores-Villar, or any other similarly situated hypothetical offender, is
not a factor in determining which standards govern his attainment of U.S. citizenship.64
However, sex and gender are still facially codified in the relevant immigration pro-
visions above. An unmarried female parent receives different treatment for her child
than an unmarried male parent does. These disparate outcomes are the result of a codi-
fication of a gender stereotype treating U.S. citizens differently based on their sex.
B. Additional Case Law Addressing Gender Discrimination in Immigration
Jurisprudence
Flores-Villar was decided without opinion likely because the deadlocked court
had nothing further to add to the debate.65 Similar cases had been heard previously,66
and despite some initial speculation, Flores-Villar would not be a case to make new
law, but simply a case that relied on the existing bedrock of immigration law.
1. Fiallo v. Bell
Fiallo v. Bell67 was the first modern case to establish a precedent for Flores-Villar.
Fiallo raised a Fifth Amendment challenge to the provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),68 which failed to confer a preferred immigration status
on the illegitimate children of fathers who are United States citizens.69 The Court de-
termined that the INA did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the choice “not
to accord preferential [treatment] to this particular class of aliens . . . remains one
‘solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this
63 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
64 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), (c) (drawing legal distinctions based upon the gender of the
parent, but not of the child).
65 See Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
66 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
67 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). The Fiallo plaintiffs raised a challenge to a dif-
ferent provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1121 (2006), which is not
directly on point for purposes of this Note. However, a discussion has been included because
the Court has relied on the logic in Fiallo when deciding Miller. See Miller v. Albright, 523
U.S. 420, 435–36 (1998).
68 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b); Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788.
69 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788–89.
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Court to control.’”70 However, the Court upheld Congress’s law while agreeing with
the petitioner families that the provision of the INA in question did not allow fathers
to prove the strength of their relationships with their illegitimate children;71 nor did the
Court seem to believe there was much of a legitimate government interest furthered
by the standard.72 Even a slight government interest was sufficient due to Congress’s
hefty power to legislate immigration issues.73
2. Miller v. Albright
The Court subsequently addressed the issue again in Miller v. Albright.74 The
Court distinguished Miller from Fiallo by determining that Fiallo dealt with extend-
ing citizenship rights to a specific class of illegitimate children,75 while the petitioner
in Miller was only asking the Court to “confirm her pre-existing citizenship rather than
grant her rights that she does not now possess.”76
Miller dealt with a Filipino national who did not have a strong connection to her
father or to the United States until after she had reached the age of majority.77 The peti-
tioner brought a Fifth Amendment due process challenge to the provision in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a) requiring fathers, but not mothers, to take additional affirmative steps before
transferring citizenship to an illegitimate child and requiring those steps to be taken
before the child reaches twenty-one years of age.78 In a notably fractured opinion, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).79
70 Id. at 799 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)).
71 Id. at 797–99.
72 Id. at 798–99.
73 Id.
74 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
75 Id. at 429. For a discussion of the idea that the only way for a person born outside the
United States to obtain citizenship by birth is through an act of Congress, not a decision by the
Court, see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702–03 (1898).
76 Miller, 523 U.S. at 432.
77 Id. at 425–26.
78 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3)–(4) (2006); Miller, 523 U.S. at 424.
79 Miller, 523 U.S. at 445. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court and joined by Justice
Rehnquist, found the statute proper under the Fifth Amendment. See generally id. at 428–45.
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment, while noting that the Court lacked
the power to grant citizenship as a remedy. Id. at 452–53 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy also concurred in the judgment, but believed that Miller did not have
standing to raise the substantive legal claims because they depended too heavily on Miller’s
father. Id. at 445–46 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer, dissented, arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) was unconstitutional. Id. at 460 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter also dissented, on the
grounds that the case deserved heightened scrutiny, and that 8 U.S.C. § 1409 violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 471–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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3. Nguyen v. INS
Nguyen v. INS dealt with a Vietnamese national who was raised by his father in
the United States from the age of six.80 Petitioner, along with his father, brought a
Fifth Amendment due process challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1409, claiming that it imper-
missibly imposed different statutory requirements for a child’s citizenship based on
which parent is a U.S. citizen.81 The Court held that Nguyen dealt with an issue not
resolved by the majority in Miller.82 However, both cases addressed the constitution-
ality of the same statute and the Nguyen court did not specify which issue was novel
to the Nguyen case; it is more likely that the Court chose to hear Nguyen three terms
after hearing Miller because it meant that the Court would have a chance to clarify the
Miller ruling and eliminate the circuit split caused by the fractured opinion therein.83
Additionally, Nguyen’s father was a party to the suit, alleviating some of the standing
concerns raised by Miller.84
III. GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW AS IT CONFLICTS WITH IMMIGRATION LAW
Although the power for intervention remains, courts have been reluctant to use
their oversight role to influence gender protection laws falling under the broad um-
brella of Congress’s immigration law powers.85 Commentators note that, although the
gender disparities at work in 8 U.S.C. § 1409 likely would not withstand the height-
ened scrutiny normally applied to facially discriminatory statutes, the typical anti-
gender discrimination rationales do not pull the same weight in immigration cases.86
Thus, the history that follows suggests that Flores-Villar had already been decided
long before it was even heard by the Court.
80 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57 (2001).
81 Id. at 56–58.
82 Id. at 56.
83 Compare Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)
(holding that the government had important interests and U.S.C. § 1409 was well-tailored
to support those interests), with Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that 8
U.S.C. § 1409 did violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that the
Court could provide a remedy by recognizing citizenship conferred by birth, but not by
conferring citizenship on a party), and United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that heightened scrutiny applies and the additional paternal re-
quirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1409 were unconstitutional where a party had standing to bring
a case).
84 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57–58.
85 See supra note 5; see also supra note 70.
86 See Debra L. Satinoff, Comment, Sex-Based Discrimination in U.S. Immigration Law,
47 AM. U. L. REV. 1353, 1360–61 (1998).
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A. General Development of Gender Discrimination Law
The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.87
Although the Fifth Amendment does not explicitly impose an equal protection guar-
antee on federal laws (such as those in the immigration realm), the Court has indicated
that such a protection is at least implicitly present.88 The promise of equal protection
has long been used by the Supreme Court to overturn discriminatory laws.89 Many of
these laws were facially discriminatory, with the text of the statute itself containing
language in violation of equal protection provisions.90 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) is one of
the few facially gender-discriminatory statutes remaining in effect.91 Since 1971, the
Court has struck down many statutes that discriminate on the basis of gender.92
Although most gender discrimination cases have traditionally been brought on
behalf of women,93 it should be noted that, “[t]he fact that a state statutory scheme
87 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
88 See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (addressing segregation in the
District of Columbia’s public schools and noting that “[i]n view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government”);
see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975) (“This Court's approach to
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal pro-
tection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (holding unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment a military benefit scheme that
gives different benefits based on gender).
89 See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that a pro-
vision of a state probate code giving preference to men over women when applying for ap-
pointment as administrator of an estate violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation
of white and black children in public schools solely on the basis of race is an unconstitutional
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
90 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down an anti-miscegenation law
that specifically referenced race).
91 See generally Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Equal Protection and Due Process Clause
Challenges Based on Sex Discrimination—Supreme Court Cases, 178 A.L.R. FED. 25 (2008)
(listing examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld challenges to statutes that
discriminate based on gender).
92 Id. § 2[a].
93 See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (holding that benefits given by U.S. military to U.S.
military family members cannot be distributed based on gender); Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (challeng-
ing Idaho probate code that gave preference to male estate executors).
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expressly discriminates against men rather than women does not protect it from equal
protection scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.”94 As such, there have been gender discrimination cases brought by men.95
The Court has recognized that gender discrimination cases are worthy of more
than rational basis review, however not worthy of the same strict scrutiny applied to
race discrimination cases.96 Consequently, the Court has developed a middle-tier, or
heightened scrutiny level, that applies to gender-based discrimination cases; under
heightened scrutiny, any discriminatory statute or action by the government must
serve an important governmental purpose and be substantially related to that impor-
tant government purpose.97
Though the heightened scrutiny standard has been consistently recognized since
it was first announced in the 1970s, courts have sometimes found different applications
for the standard, depending on the issue.98 For example, the Court has traditionally been
more deferential to statutes that treat the genders differently if there is a genuine dif-
ference between the two genders and if there is no evidence of a gender stereotype.99
This unique application of the statutes comes from the principle in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.100 that the Constitution is meant to ensure that similarly
situated persons are treated alike under the law.101 By definition, a biological difference
94 Wooster, supra note 91, § 8.
95 See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In this case, males challenged an
Oklahoma law allowing 18-to-21-year-old women, but not men, to purchase 3.2% beer. Id.
at 191–92. The Court held that the Oklahoma law was an unconstitutional violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 204.
96 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Classifications based on race or
national origin . . . are given the most exacting scrutiny. Between [the] extremes of rational
basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been
applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”); Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (“[G]ender-based discriminations must serve important
governmental objectives and . . . the discriminatory means employed must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.”).
97 See Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150.
98 See generally Rachel K. Alexander, Case Note, Nguyen v. INS: The Supreme Court
Rationalizes Gender-Based Distinctions in Upholding an Equal Protection Challenge, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 789 (2002).
99 See, e.g., California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289–92 (1987)
(extending additional benefits to women under Title VII to guarantee labor equality during preg-
nancy); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“‘Inherent differences’
between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not
for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s
opportunity.”) But cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1977) (noting that the “difference
between males and females, with respect to the purchase of 3.2% beer” does not warrant dif-
ferent treatment of the sexes).
100 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
101 Id. at 439. The reasoning in Cleburne supports the premise that gender discrimination
is permissible in cases where there is a physical and undeniable difference between the genders,
rendering them dissimilarly situated. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
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between men and women means that they are not similarly situated and therefore, in
some circumstances, it may be permissible to treat the two genders differently.102
The idea of similarly positioned parties receiving similar outcomes has often been
at tension with the ideals of immigration law.103 The Court has noted on multiple occa-
sions that parties would receive different results in gender discrimination cases inside
the umbrella of immigration law as compared to outside immigration law.104 This is
due to a long line of history supporting the Court’s deference to Congress on matters
dealing with aliens and international law.105 The example posed in the introduction to
this Note is a prime example of two parties, almost identically situated, who receive
drastically disparate outcomes in cases inside and outside of immigration law. It bears
exploring, then, how immigration cases apply, or rather fail to apply, the gender-based
discrimination level of heightened scrutiny.
B. The Appropriate Level of Scrutiny for Gender Discrimination Cases Falling
Under Immigration Law
Traditionally, cases dealing with gender-based discrimination receive heightened
scrutiny. However, this conflicts with the Court’s desire to give extreme deference to
Congress in issues dealing with immigration. As such, a lower standard was applied
in the earlier immigration cases.106 In Miller and Nguyen the Court nominally applied
heightened scrutiny, but, as Justice O’Connor argued in her dissent to Nguyen and
concurrence to Miller, applied it loosely and contrary to precedent.107 For example,
102 See Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (acknowledging that biological differences between men and
women may require some different treatment in a military education setting).
103 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad power
over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unaccept-
able if applied to citizens.”).
104 Satinoff, supra note 86, at 1360–61 (“[O]ne is far less likely to succeed in challenging
an immigration law implicating a gender-based classification on equal protection grounds than
if one challenged the exact same-gender based classification in a non-immigration context.”).
105 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[T]he power to admit or ex-
clude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies
pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with
the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive
Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. But that
the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as
firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our
government.” (citations omitted) (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950);
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903))).
106 See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792–96 (1977) (noting that immigration cases
receive less judicial scrutiny).
107 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 440 (1998); id. at 451 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that § 1409
is upheld as constitutional because Miller’s challenge only triggered rational basis scrutiny
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her dissent in Nguyen notes that the “majority opinion represents far less than the
rigorous application of heightened scrutiny that our precedents require.”108 In a 1984
article on immigration and plenary power, Stephen Legomsky stated that “immigration
is an area in which the normal rules of constitutional law simply do not apply.”109
Regardless of which level of scrutiny applies to gender discrimination cases in an
immigration context,110 in order for 8 U.S.C. § 1409 to be constitutional, any gender-
based discrimination by the government at least needs to pass rational basis review,
and therefore needs to be, at a minimum, rationally connected to a legitimate govern-
ment interest.111
The government has laid out three possible interests advanced by 8 U.S.C. § 1409:
ensuring that a biological tie exists between the child and the father,112 ensuring that
the child has a chance to form a relationship with the parent and the United States,113
and preventing statelessness.114 These government justifications were presented differ-
ently, or sometimes not presented at all, among the cases, so they are best analyzed
individually, rather than as a component of each case.
1. Ensuring There Is a Biological Relationship Between the Father and
Illegitimate Child
Fiallo, Miller, Flores-Villar, and Nguyen all addressed the desire to ensure that a
blood relationship exists between a father and his illegitimate child.115 Awarding citi-
zenship to a child grants that child access to all legal protections and services of the
United States, as well as full access to the political process.116 With this in mind, Con-
gress should certainly have the right to restrict conveyance of citizenship—however,
those restrictions should be consistent across genders. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 does not re-
quire a mother to prove her maternity to a child in order to transmit her United States
because § 1409 does not make gender-based distinctions but that § 1409 might not pass a
heightened scrutiny test).
108 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 79 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor charged the majority
opinion with failing to: adequately explain the importance of the government interests at issue,
discuss whether there is a more germane basis of classification instead of sex, and determine
whether the interests the government proposes are actually important. Id. at 79–80.
109 Legomsky, supra note 13, at 260.
110 For an evaluation of which level of scrutiny applies to cases dealing with gender discrim-
ination in immigration statutes, see supra Part III.B.
111 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
112 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
113 Id. at 64–65.
114 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 430 n.8 (1998).
115 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62; Miller, 523 U.S. at 435; Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798
(1977); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 995–96 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d without
opinion, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
116 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 67.
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citizenship to that child.117 This does seem logical at first; a mother is necessarily pres-
ent at the child’s birth and knows of the child’s existence.118 However, approximately
one-half of all child births in developing nations are not registered.119 Though a mother
knows of the birth of her child, and that the child is hers, it is likely that the mother
has no legal documentation confirming the biological tie to her child.120 Without such
documentation, immigration officials in the United States cannot verify the maternity
of a child, beyond taking the mother’s word for it. Although mothers are taken at their
word, immigration officials are not willing to take this step with fathers. Even if a
father is present at the birth, if there is no birth certificate issued listing him as the
father, he must take further affirmative steps under 8 U.S.C. § 1409 in order to verify
his paternity.121 These additional affirmative steps place two similarly situated unwed
parents, both present at the birth of their child, in different legal positions based solely
on their gender.
2. Ensuring the Opportunity for an Actual and Meaningful Bond to Develop
Between the Child and the Father
The Court in Nguyen made the distinction between the opportunity for an actual
relationship to develop between a child and her United States citizen parent, regard-
less of whether that relationship ever comes to fruition, and the absence of such an
opportunity.122 According to the Court’s line of reasoning, the fact that the mother
is present at birth is enough to trigger this opportunity, even if the mother does not
have an actual relationship with that child after the day of the birth.123 This argument
was also present in Miller.124 In Miller, the Court quoted the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion, noting that “[a] mother is far less likely to ignore
the child she has carried in her womb than is the natural father, who may not even be
aware of its existence.”125 This statement represents a purely hypothetical and overly
broad view of unwed fathers’ response to their children. The Court offered no empiri-
cal proof that more fathers than mothers abandon their children born overseas; it just
117 See, e.g., Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 995; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (explaining the
additional steps a father must take to prove paternity).
118 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68.
119 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Birth Registration: A Topic Proposed for an Executive
Committee Conclusion on International Protection, ¶ 5, U.N. DOC. EC/61/SC/CRP.5 (Feb. 9,
2010) [hereinafter UNHCR], available at http://www.unhcr.org/4b910bf19.pdf.
120 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 3,5.
121 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (mandating that a child born outside the United States, and out
of wedlock “shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother”); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
122 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 67.
123 See id.
124 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 427 (1998).
125 Id. (quoting Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 427 (1998)).
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stated that such behavior is common in men, especially those in the military, when
living abroad.126 Furthermore, Flores-Villar and Nguyen evince examples of cases
where the child’s father provided full support and the child had little or no interaction
with his mother after birth.127
3. Preventing Statelessness
In Miller, the government cited the prevention of statelessness as a legitimate
interest furthered by 8 U.S.C. § 1409.128 The Court failed to address statelessness as
a concern. The majority in Nguyen also ignored the statelessness issue, despite the fact
that the government again raised it as a legitimate government interest.129 The Ninth
Circuit addresses and strongly supports the statelessness argument in Flores-Villar,130
despite the fact that prior opinions failed to do so. Concerns about statelessness are
legitimate and cannot be fully explained by constitutional law doctrine. Further review
of statelessness law is required.
Immigration in the United States is framed around the permanent settler model:
a model describing the formation and development of immigration policies in nations
which were originally colonized through the displacement of indigenous populations.131
Due to a shared sense of the immigrant mentality, “countries that develop through per-
manent settler colonization become the most receptive states toward immigrants of
diverse races and ethnic groups. . . . Many ideologies have developed about settlement
processes; some about offering a ‘safe haven’ for the poor and persecuted, others about
the contributions of immigrants to building the nation.”132 Despite the general open-
ness of the United States to receiving immigrants, particularly those fleeing stateless-
ness, war or persecution,133 the United States has not always favored immigrants from
126 Id. at 439.
127 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57 (noting that Nguyen lived with his father in the United States
for most of his life); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d
without opinion, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (noting that Flores-Villar was raised by his father
and grandmother).
128 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 430–31 n.8.
129 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Punctuating the disparity between
the majority’s and the INS’ accounts of the governmental interests at stake is the majority’s fail-
ure even to address the INS’ second asserted rationale: that § 1409 prevents certain children
from being stateless.”).
130 See Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 996–98.
131 JANOSKI, supra note 28, at 12–14 (describing the process through which views and
politics form in nations, like the United States, which were initially colonized through the
displacement of indigenous peoples).
132 Id. at 12–13.
133 See, e.g., Maria Otero, Under Sec’y for Democracy & Global Affairs, U.S. Department
of State, Remarks on Statelessness and Gender Discrimination at the Refugees International
Event, U.S. Inst. of Peace (Oct. 25, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/g
/176132.htm).
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particular groups.134 The ironic result of the United States’ attempts to create an open
door immigration policy is a system that favors unwed mothers and their children,
despite attenuated connections to the nation, because there is a perception that these
parties have nowhere else to go, while excluding parties, who in the case of Nguyen
and Flores-Villar have very strong ties to the United States.
Statelessness is a serious concern for many nations.135 The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has listed prevention of statelessness through
documentation as one of its Global Strategic Priorities.136 The report cited a 2009
UNICEF study that found that roughly one-half of children in developing nations were
not registered or provided with necessary citizenship documentation immediately after
birth.137 Though not always synonymous with statelessness, this lack of birth registra-
tion can increase the chances that a child’s birth will not be recognized by a nation.138
A lack of birth registration can also lead to difficulties accessing health and education
services.139 However, when describing how to attain goals related to increased docu-
mentation of children at birth, UNHCR states that registration should be facilitated
through, “[n]on-discrimination, ensuring equal access to birth registration for all per-
sons of concern to UNHCR, regardless of such factors as nationality, immigration
status or marital status of the parents.”140
The United States is not one of the nations on the UNHCR watch list for stateless
persons.141 However, the U.S. Department of State has taken a strong stance on the
prevention of statelessness through increased registration.142 As a nation working so
vehemently to prevent statelessness, the United States should use its own immigration
laws to set a positive example for developing nations. 8 U.S.C. § 1409, however, fails
to comport with UNHCR goals in two ways. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 discriminates based
on marital status of the parents, contrary to the UNHCR provisions disapproving of
such immigration status laws.143 Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 requires U.S. citizen mothers
wishing to transfer citizenship to their children to have been physically present in the
134 See, e.g., JANOSKI, supra note 28, at 111–14.
135 See, e.g., Otero, supra note 133.
136 UNHCR, supra note 119, ¶ 5.
137 Id. (citing UNICEF, STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN SPECIAL EDITION: CELEBRATING
20 YEARS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Tbl. 9 (2009)).
138 See, e.g., P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161–69
(2d ed. 1979) (describing “absolute statelessness,” obtained at birth, and “subsequent state-
lessness,” which happens after birth, due to some other condition, such as a territorial changes
or a failure to register for nationality).
139 UNHCR, supra note 119, ¶ 7(c) (describing the U.N.’s plan to integrate birth regis-
tration with “public programmes such as those relating to childbirth, maternal-infant care,
immunization and education”).
140 Id. ¶ 7(b).
141 For the watch list, see UN HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
2010: STATISTICAL ANNEX tbl. 7 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ef9c7269.html.
142 See Otero, supra note 133.
143 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006), with UNHCR, supra note 119, ¶ 7(b).
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United States for at least one year.144 Some women simply will not meet this physical
presence requirement. However, statelessness is such a serious concern that it is un-
likely that a mother’s failure to meet the physical presence requirement will completely
bar her child from attaining U.S. citizenship.145
8 U.S.C. § 1409 then, is rendered useless in preventing statelessness. In Nguyen,
the government alluded to this in its brief by admitting that if forced to equalize im-
migration regulations with regard to unwed mothers and fathers, they would take away
the current preference given to unwed mothers.146 If the government actually believed
that 8 U.S.C. § 1409© prevented statelessness, they would likely have defended the
statute more zealously due to the importance of eliminating statelessness. By conced-
ing that they would take away the preference to mothers, rather than extending it to
fathers, the government has indicated that its interest in lowering the number of state-
less children is a lower priority than the other interests the government has advanced
in support of differing policies for maternal and paternal naturalization.147
C. The Insurmountable Problem of Stare Decisis in Immigration Law
Though the Court has consistently deferred to Congress’s supremacy on issues
dealing with immigration law,148 the opinions and rationale behind upholding the con-
stitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) have been remarkably inconsistent and fractured
among the Justices, and across the cases.149 Also telling is the fact that the Court has
heard challenges to different aspects of the case on three separate occasions in the
past fifteen years; if the law were truly settled by Congress’s extremely broad discre-
tion in cases dealing with immigration and aliens, the Court likely would not have to
address the same statute three times.150 The Court, rather than recognizing that stare
144 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
145 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001).
146 Brief for the Respondent at 10, Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (No. 99-2071).
147 Erin Chlopak, Comment, Mandatory Motherhood and Frustrated Fatherhood: The
Supreme Court’s Preservation of Gender Discrimination in American Citizenship Law, 51
AM. U. L. REV. 967, 990 (2002). Chlopak notes:
The government’s own brief . . . [concedes] that, if forced to equalize the
maternal and paternal regulations, the “appropriate course would be to
deny unwed mothers their current preference.” By admitting its ulti-
mate willingness to sacrifice the means by which § 1409 may prevent
statelessness, the government casts doubt on the value of that goal and
ultimately on the substantiality of the relationship between preventing
statelessness and creating gender-based categories to do so.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 10, Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (No.
99-2071)).
148 See supra note 5; see also supra note 70.
149 See supra Part II.
150 Due to a variety of procedural questions and anomalies, the Court has yet to fully decide
an immigration case dealing with 8 U.S.C. § 1409. Four Justices in Miller could not overcome
the question of whether the plaintiff, without her father joined as a party, had standing to bring
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decisis requires that immigration law trump gender discrimination concerns presented
by Flores-Villar, has tried to use strong government interests as a vehicle to justify the
disparate gender outcomes present in 8 U.S.C. § 1409. Though the Court is free to base
its decision on a mix of stare decisis and strong governmental interests, deciding cases
based on gender discrimination grounds has left the statute open to continued attacks
on the legitimacy of the government’s proposed interests. Alternatively, a strong stare
decisis reading of the cases suggests that immigration law has closed the door on the
equal protection concerns raised in response to 8 U.S.C. § 1409.151 As such, litigants
like Flores-Villar will need to seek a different vehicle to address the inequities pre-
sented by 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
1. Congress’s Plenary Power in Immigration Law Is Not an Absolute Grant
of Power
As noted in Kleindienst v. Mandel,152 Congress has a markedly broad grant of
power in matters dealing with immigration law.153 However, the Court’s role is to limit
Congress’s ability to pass laws that treat similar parties differently under immigration
laws.154 Congress’s discretion is not complete and is at its weakest point when dealing
the discrimination case. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 445–46 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 454
n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, who authored the majority opinion, presumably
decided that the standing issue was cured by the inclusion of Nguyen’s father in the latter
proceeding. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58. Justice O’Connor does not specifically address the
standing issue in her dissent, however she did reach the merits of the case, suggesting that she
also believed the standing concerns from Miller were remedied by the inclusion of Nguyen’s
father in the case. See id. at 74–97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Kennedy and O’Connor
split on whether 8 U.S.C. § 1409 was constitutional, allowing the case to come out in favor
of upholding the law. See generally id. Justice Kagan recused herself from the proceedings in
Flores-Villar, resulting in a deadlocked court affirming the lower opinion without opinion.
See United States v. Flores-Villar, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011).
151 For a historical explanation of the evolution of stare decisis in modern common law,
see generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding
Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659–81 (1999).
152 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
153 Id. at 765–66. The Court held that:
[T]he power to exclude aliens is “inherent in sovereignty, necessary for
maintaining normal international relations and defending the country
against foreign encroachments and dangers—a power to be exercised
exclusively by the political branches of government . . . .” The Court
without exception has sustained Congress’ “plenary power to make rules
for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those
characteristics which Congress has forbidden.”
Id. (citing Brief for the United States at 20, Kleindienst, 408 U.S. 753 (No. 71-16), and
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 at 123).
154 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010). The Court wrote: “When
Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due deference; but Congress
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with laws that infringe on substantive rights under another area of law, or with another
branch’s ability to perform its constitutional functions.155
When addressing immigration due process concerns in Galvan v. Press,156 Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the court, explained:
In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due
process as a limitation upon all powers of Congress . . . much
could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that
the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion
heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the
entry and deportation of aliens. . . .
But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of
Congress under review, there is not merely “a page of history,”
but a whole volume.157
However, stare decisis cannot forever be used as a crutch to maintain a law after the
social justification for that law has crumbled.158 Despite this consideration, the Court
has recently cemented its position that, for the time being, stare decisis bars the modi-
fication of the discriminatory effect of 8 U.S.C. § 1409.159
may not choose an unconstitutional remedy.” Id. Though the issue at hand in Citizens United
was a First Amendment challenge to a campaign finance law, the Court made a cogent point
about the laws Congress chooses to pass: they do not have to be the best, or the only, solution
to a problem identified by legislators, but they must abide by constitutional provisions. See id.
155 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (detailing the long history of sepa-
ration of powers as an “essential constitutional function[ ]”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the varying de-
grees of presidential power over an issue based on whether another branch of the government
has expressly ruled on that issue).
156 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
157 Id. at 530–31 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)) (citations
omitted) (citing Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 155 (1919)).
158 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). The Court
held that:
[I]t is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an “inexo-
rable command,” and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case.
Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic consid-
erations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision
with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of
reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask
whether . . . facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as
to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
Id. (citations omitted).
159 See United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d without opinion,
131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
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2. The Court’s Inability to Grant Citizenship as a Remedy
Even if the Court was to find that the provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1409 are unconstitu-
tional, the Court does not have the power to grant citizenship as a remedy.160 Therefore,
all the Court can do for parties like Flores-Villar is find the law unconstitutional and
require Congress to revise the provisions. Due to the current makeup of the Court and
the long history of upholding 8 U.S.C. § 1409, it is likely the Court is far from doing
this. However, as the Second Circuit demonstrated in Lake v. Reno161, the Court is al-
lowed to recognize citizenship conferred on a party by the nature of his or her birth;162
only the Court’s attempt to grant citizenship to parties who do not have standing under
existing immigration laws is forbidden by the Constitution’s grant of plenary power
to Congress.163
The unusually high deference the Court grants Congress in matters relating to
immigration has led the Court to uphold the facially discriminatory immigration pro-
visions in 8 U.S.C. § 1409. If the Court ever wishes to correct the gender disparity
in immigration law, its “whole volume”164 of history is probably an incorrect vessel.
The following sections analyze the changing social landscape that justify beginning
a new volume of law—one that focuses on principles of family law over those of
immigration law.
IV. IMMIGRATION LAW AS IT RELATES TO FAMILY LAW AND THE
HISTORY OF PATERNAL DISCRIMINATION
Considering 8 U.S.C. § 1409 in accordance with family law principles, and
family law principles’ higher deference to parental rights, is a better means for the
Court to correct its past decisions, without interfering with Congress’s plenary
power over immigration issues. Additionally, finding an alternate method to correct
the gender disparity of 8 U.S.C. § 1409 ensures horizontal equity between equally
situated parties, regardless of whether the case involves immigration law.
A. Stereotypes About the Role of Unwed Parents
“The putative father often goes on his way unconscious of the birth of the child.
Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence of any
160 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 456 (1998) (“Because only Congress has the power
to set the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by persons not born within the territory
of the United States, federal courts cannot exercise that power under the guise of their remedial
authority. ‘Neither by application of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by invocation of equitable
powers, nor by any other means does a court have the power to confer citizenship in violation
of [statutory] limitations.’” (quoting INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 885 (1988))).
161 226 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2000).
162 See id. at 149 (finding that the petitioner, pursuant to congressional enactment, is a
U.S. citizen).
163 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
164 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954); supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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ties to the mother.”165 This statement from Miller is indicative of the idea that fathers,
if not forced through the bonds of marriage to interact with a child, will choose not to
do so.166 Such social observations are sometimes masked by physical differences in the
parties in an attempt to treat similarly situated parties differently in immigration law.167
Professor Ann Wooster used the Nguyen case to provide an example where a true
difference between the genders was relevant in an immigration context, quoting the
Court in pertinent part that “the difference between men and women in relation to the
birth process is a real one, and the principle of equal protection did not forbid Congress
to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.”168 There is cer-
tainly a biological difference between the genders. However, in the same opinion in
which he wrote that “none of the premises on which the statutory classification is
grounded can be fairly characterized as an accidental byproduct of a traditional way
of thinking about the members of either sex,”169 He also wrote two full pages discuss-
ing the irresponsibility of servicemen and the likelihood that they would not be in-
volved in the day-to-day life of their children.170 The Stevens majority also considered
the fact that, because a mother is necessarily present at her child’s birth, she will be a
more prevalent part of the child’s life than a father, who may choose, without biologi-
cal necessity, to be at the birth of his child.171 Essentially, Justice Stevens denied the
presence of gender stereotypes in 8 U.S.C. § 1409, while writing an opinion rife with
gender stereotypes. For example, “Men are not fathers in the relevant sense for U.S.
citizenship until, as Justice Stevens states, ‘either the father or his child takes certain
affirmative steps to create or confirm their relationship.’”172
Justice Stevens noted that “[t]he biological differences between single men and
single women provide a relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability to
confer citizenship on children born in foreign lands.”173 However, the differences that
Justice Stevens highlighted are all social in nature. The Miller Court established citi-
zenship for a mother as biological in nature. The Miller Court however, determined
that a biological tie to a child was not enough to allow a father to transmit citizenship
to a child.174 The Court required social factors to determine that unwed fathers have
a strong connection to the child.175
165 Miller, 523 U.S. at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Parnam v. Hughes,
441 U.S. 347, 355 n. 7 (1979)).
166 See, e.g., supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
167 See supra Part I.B.2.
168 See Wooster, supra note 91, § 9 (quoting Ngyuen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001)).
169 Miller, 523 U.S. at 444–45.
170 Id. at 438–40.
171 Id. at 438.
172 Augustine-Adams, supra note 13, at 104 (quoting Miller, 523 U.S. at 424).
173 Miller, 523 U.S. at 445.
174 Id. at 429–30 (requiring the father to meet the residency requirements in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a)).
175 Augustine-Adams, supra note 13, at 104.
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If there truly is a biological reason to distinguish between gender for unmarried
men and women, why would the distinction not apply to married men and women?
Specifically, why is it easier for a married citizen father to confer citizenship than an
unwed citizen father?176 Why is it more difficult for a married mother to transmit
citizenship than an unwed mother?177 This juxtaposition indicates that the congres-
sional justification for 8 U.S.C. § 1409 is much more about social, rather than bio-
logical factors. Gender stereotypes about mothers and fathers have likely affected
the legislation.
B. Changing Importance of Marriage in Other Areas of Law
Immigration legislation depends largely on the marital status of the parties in-
volved.178 With regard to documentation to reduce statelessness, however, UNHCR
states that marital status should not be a factor in obtaining documentation for a child.179
There is no language in the immigration statutes or the legislative history surrounding
them that suggests marriage is a key factor in a party’s immigration rights. The line
is not straight either; unmarried mothers are in a better position than married mothers
while unwed fathers are in a worse position than married fathers. This inequity sug-
gests that the only time we value a father’s parenting abilities is when he is married
to a child’s mother.180 Should a couple choose not to marry, despite the presence of a
child in the relationship, the mother will be given additional opportunity to transfer her
citizenship to the child. The father, despite his ability to prove that he is the sole guard-
ian and supporter of a child, will be forced to take additional steps to legitimize the
citizenship of his child.181
In a wrongful death case dealing with the rights of a father who failed to legitimize
his child, the Court wrote:
The appellant, as the natural father, was responsible for conceiv-
ing an illegitimate child and had the opportunity to legitimate the
child but failed to do so. Legitimation would have removed the
stigma of bastardy and allowed the child to inherit from the father
in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock. Unlike the ille-
gitimate child for whom the status of illegitimacy is involuntary
and immutable, the appellant here was responsible for fostering
an illegitimate child and for failing to change its status. It is thus
176 Id. at 101–03.
177 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2006).
178 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401; 1409.
179 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
180 See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 326 (2005) (discussing
the varying legal definitions of fatherhood).
181 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2006).
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neither illogical nor unjust for society to express its “condemnation
of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bounds of marriage” by not
conferring upon a biological father the statutory right to sue for
the wrongful death of his illegitimate child.182
There is a long history of legal presumptions against fathers in the family law context.183
In fact, paternal rights were not expressly recognized by the Court until 1972.184 Part
of the rationale behind imposing an additional paternity requirement for fathers is the
assumption that “[i]n almost all cases, the unwed mother is readily identifiable, gen-
erally from hospital records, and alternatively by physicians or others attending the
child’s birth,” while “[u]nwed fathers, as a class, are not traditionally quite so easy to
identify and locate. Many of them either deny all responsibility or exhibit no interest
in the child or its welfare.”185
In the United States, it is empirically true that it is easy to identify a child’s biolog-
ical mother; new births are documented and recorded in approximately 98% of cases.186
However the same is not true in the births of the kind at issue in these cases. As a result,
the following assumptions are at least partially incorrect:
[A]ll [mothers] will be present at the event that transmits their citi-
zenship to the child, that hospital records and birth certificates will
normally make a further acknowledgment and formal proof of
parentage unnecessary, and that their initial custody will at least
give them the opportunity to develop a caring relationship with
the child.187
It is, of course, possible to determine the maternity of a child through a DNA test or
attempts to contact physicians or others present at the birth. However, the Court has
indicated that this further step of DNA testing is unnecessary.188 How then, are courts
able to justify the same costs when it comes to establishing fathers’ paternity?
The answer likely stems from societal perceptions about the role unwed fathers
play in their children’s lives. Because fathers are less likely to be present in their
182 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (citations omitted) (citing GA. CODE ANN.
§ 74-103 (1978)).
183 See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parental Rights,
40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 647–48 (1993).
184 Id. at 647; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
185 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
186 See UNICEF, Birth Registration: Right from the Start, 9 INNOCENTI DIG. 1, 8 (2002),
available at http://www.childinfo.org/files/birthregistration_Digestenglish.pdf (noting that
2% of births in industrialized countries are unrecorded).
187 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 444 (1998).
188 See id. at 436 (dismissing the requirement for biological proof of motherhood because it
“is immediately obvious and is typically established by hospital records and birth certificates”).
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children’s lives, the argument goes, the rare case when an unwed father seeks to estab-
lish paternity is worth the extra cost of investigation.189 In arguing this point, the Court
notes that 8 U.S.C. § 1409 is about the opportunity to form a relationship, rather than
a parent’s decision to take advantage of that opportunity, holding that “[t]hese assump-
tions are firmly grounded and adequately explain why Congress found it unnecessary
to impose requirements on the mother that were entirely appropriate for the father.”190
Immigration law is premised on often draconian views of nuclear families, gender
roles and parenting.191 Frequently, these laws do not reflect the reality of the “func-
tional” families that care for children.192 Although it would be difficult to undertake
an extensive review of each individual family unit in order to ensure that a child peti-
tioning for U.S. citizenship through her parent meets the requirements, there need to
be more steps than currently exist.
Roughly one-third of American children are now born out of wedlock.193 Of the
roughly 34 million U.S. households with children under the age of eighteen, 33%, or
about 11.1 million, are headed by a single parent.194 Of those, 8.5 million households
are headed by a single mother and about 2.6 million are headed by a single father.195
Under the 2011 estimates, 8% of households with children, and around 23% of single-
parent households, are headed by a father raising his children without day-to-day assis-
tance from the mother.196 The number of single-father households has increased from
approximately 1.1% in 1970.197
In 1972, Justice Burger, dissenting in Stanley v. Illinois, levied a harsh criticism
against unwed fathers, reflecting a commonly held view that fathers expressed little
189 For a discussion about the special class of fathers whose children were born outside the
United States and who are “unable or unwilling” to claim paternity, see Miller, 523 U.S. at
443. The Court there held that “[a] congressional assumption that such a father and his child
are especially unlikely to develop a relationship, and thus to foster the child’s ties with this
country, has a solid basis.” Id.
190 Id. at 444.
191 Although 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409 rely on marriage to determine citizenship require-
ments for children, only 25% of American children live in so-called nuclear families comprised
of their married biological mother and father. See Murphy, supra note 180, at 327.
192 Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of
Family: Toward a Functional Definition of Family that Protects Children’s Fundamental
Human Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 510 (2009).
193 Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 246 (2006).
194 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELECTED SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES:





197 Family Structure, CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org
/?q=node/231 (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
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care for their children born out of wedlock.198 Stanley was decided just five years be-
fore Fiallo and demonstrates a commonly held point of view at a time when mothers
did actually care for most children born out of wedlock.199 However, the percentage of
single-father-headed households has increased a great deal over the past forty years.200
The more recent decisions of Miller and Nguyen relied on Fiallo,201 and the underly-
ing gender stereotypes, without considering family law developments over the past
forty years.
C. Gender Discrimination in 8 U.S.C. § 1409 as a Family Law Issue
Though it is impossible to completely ignore the immigration implications of
8 U.S.C. § 1409, it should be equally impossible to ignore the family law implications
of the statute. Indeed, family members are already given preference in some areas
of immigration law.202 The current status of immigration law, however, creates a per-
ception that unification of families, and familial rights, are dependent upon gender
198 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665–66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (1972). Justice Burger
addressed the role of mothers as follows:
[T]he biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant
creates stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds result-
ing from the male’s often casual encounter. This view is reinforced by
the observable fact that most unwed mothers exhibit a concern for their
offspring either permanently or at least until they are safely placed for
adoption, while unwed fathers rarely burden either the mother or the
child with their attentions or loyalties. Centuries of human experience
buttress this view of the realities of human conditions and suggest that
unwed mothers of illegitimate children are generally more dependable
protectors of their children than are unwed fathers.
Id.
199 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 811 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
Congress acted to benefit the child-mother relationship).
200 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
201 The Miller plurality cites Fiallo six times. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423,
428–29, 432, 455, 459 (1998). In Nguyen, the Court cites to Fiallo once, but only because
the Court found there was no equal protection violation, before reaching the analysis of
Congress’s power in immigration cases. 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
202 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (providing benefits to mothers but not fathers).
According to Justice Marshall’s dissent, special preferences for families were perfectly allowable.
He stated:
There is no dispute that the purpose of these special preference pro-
visions is to reunify families separated by the immigration laws. As
Congress itself declared “[t]he legislative history of the Immigration
and Nationality Act clearly indicates that the Congress intended [in these
provisions] to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was con-
cerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and
immigrants united.”
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1957)).
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or marital status, which is likely not the message Congress intended to send with the
passage of 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
1. The Fundamental Right to Privacy Under Family Law
The issues impacting foreign-born children of U.S. citizens are not only immigra-
tion issues—they are family issues. It is impossible to assume that immigrant families
are not affected by poverty, crime and the other concerns that come along with rais-
ing children in the United States.203 Thus, it does not make sense to view family issues
solely through the lens of immigration law. By taking a modern, inclusive view of
8 U.S.C. § 1409 as it relates to gender discrimination and the fundamental right to
privacy in a family law context, the Court could reach a more equitable and just out-
come in future cases involving 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
The Court has held that Congress and the states cannot pass laws limiting a family’s
right to choose to have,204 how to educate,205 or how to raise206 their children, because
such rights are fundamental and deserving of a particularly protective right to privacy
analysis.207 8 U.S.C. § 1409 limits an equally private familial relationship: the ability
of a father to choose where to raise a child. Either a father affected by the statute must
take steps to claim and legitimize his child or that child cannot legally be raised in the
United States.
2. Positive Developments in Paternal Rights
Despite some of the more draconian viewpoints expressed in Stanley and other
cases in the 1970s, in 1975, the Court in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld208 noted that
[i]t is no less important for a child to be cared for by its . . .
parent when that parent is male rather than female. And a father,
203 See, e.g., Mark Greenberg & Hedieh Rahmanou, Four Commentaries: Looking to the
Future, Commentary 1, 14 FUTURE CHILD. 139, 139 (2004), available at http://futureofchildren
.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/14_02_08.pdf (noting that approximately 25% of chil-
dren living in poverty are immigrants or children of immigrants and proposing that “[a]ny
national strategy for reducing child poverty, promoting child well-being, and helping low-wage
workers advance must address the needs and circumstances of immigrants and their children”).
204 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming and
clarifying a woman’s right to an abortion without undue government interference).
205 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1932) (holding that public schools could not
prohibit lessons from being taught in a language other than English).
206 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing parents’ right to choose
to place their children in a specialized school).
207 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (“The entire fabric of the
Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that
the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude
as the fundamental rights specifically protected.”).
208 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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no less than a mother, has a constitutionally protected right to the
“companionship, care, custody, and management” of “the children
he has sired and raised.”209
The Stanley Court would likely have taken issue with the concept that fathers af-
fected by 8 U.S.C. § 1409 were fathers who had “sired and raised” children under
the Weinberger conception of the idea. However, Flores-Villar and Nguyen, were
both “sired and raised” almost exclusively, by their fathers, under any definition of the
terms.210 By requiring fathers, but not mothers, to take additional affirmative steps to
legitimize their children before fathers are able to transmit their citizenship to children,
Congress is infringing upon fathers’ constitutional right to privacy.
D. Toward a Unified Definition of Paternal Rights Under Immigration and
Family Law
Traditionally, immigration was strictly a federal issue and family law was a state
law issue. However, there has been more and more overlap between the two in recent
decades. Though not the primary focus in immigration law, Congress has included
family-friendly provisions, such as reunification plans, in immigration law.211 “While
it is true that there is an underlying principle of family unification in immigration laws,
there is at the same time specific direction as to what relationships are to be recognized
for immigration benefits.”212 These relationships are often quite narrow and frequently
violate the family law tenet of acting in the best interest of a child.213 Additionally,
family and domestic relations courts are sometimes called on to interpret immigration
issues.214 As immigration and family law become more intertwined, should states have
a larger say in the regulation of immigration law?215
209 Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 652 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
210 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57; Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994.
211 King, supra note 192, at 525 n.51.
212 Matter of Repuyan, 19 I. & N. 119, 121 (B.I.A. 1984).
213 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 181–82 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the “best-interests-of-
the-child doctrine” as “[t]he principle that courts should make custody decisions based on what-
ever best advances the child’s welfare, regardless of a claimant’s particular status or relationship
with the child”).
214 See generally Nikki Smith, Children’s Rights Nationally and Internationally During the
Deportation of Their Parents or Themselves: Does the Right to Sovereignty Trump the Best
Interest of the Child?, 5 CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J. 1 (2012) (describing how state domestic re-
lations courts often have to interpret federal immigration statutes in considering whether U.S.
citizen children should remain in the United States or be deported along with alien parents).
215 One area of this debate is highlighted particularly well by the case of Elián González.
González, a six year old Cuban boy who captivated media attention in 2000, was forcibly re-
moved from a relative’s home in Miami and sent back to Cuba to live with his father, in accor-
dance with international family law and reunification principles. See generally Tim Padgett,
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The Court has made it clear that state law does not supplant federal immigration
law.216 If, however, the state passes laws consistent with federal immigration policy,
this overlap may act as an exception to Congress’s plenary immigration power.217 The
Court has held that “[t]he State, of course, has a duty of the highest order to protect the
interests of minor children. . . . The goal of granting custody based on the best inter-
ests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental interest for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause.”218 Thus, it could stand to reason that states might have
some leeway in legislating family law issues that also implicate immigration concerns.
Indeed, the Court in DeCanas noted that “an independent review does not reveal[ ]
any specific indication in either the wording or the legislative history of the INA that
Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in
general.”219 As family law begins to intermingle more and more with immigration law,
the equal protection concerns expressed by Flores-Villar and its predecessors weave
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Rather, all these parties can do is wait for the ideals of family law to seep deeper into
the immigration law ideology.
CONCLUSION
Though the Court has had past opportunities to overturn 8 U.S.C. § 1409, it has
deferred to congressional judgment thus far and refused to do so, alternately citing
alleged legitimate government interests furthered by the statute. Due to the volumes
of historical discretion granted to Congress in matters of immigration law, further
immigration-based challenges to 8 U.S.C. § 1409 are likely to be futile. As immigra-
tion and foreign travel become increasingly possible, changing social factors and
perceptions about fatherhood lead to more single-father-headed households. There-
fore, the situation in Flores-Villar is likely to become more common. This increase
in single-father-headed households, in conjunction with changing views on fathers and
fatherhoods, leaves much to be desired under a statute that accords different rights
to fathers and mothers based only on their gender. Thus, the Court has reached an
impasse between an immigration statute that cannot be overturned without upsetting
large amounts of precedent, and a fundamentally discriminatory outcome under that
immigration statute.
Future challenges or modifications to 8 U.S.C. § 1409 should move away from the
immigration line of cases and focus instead on the statute’s family law and fundamental
privacy implications. The more encompassing, and increasingly father-friendly, area of
family law could provide the Court with the necessary vehicle to overturn or circum-
vent the statute in the future and secure a more just outcome for children born out of
wedlock to U.S. citizen fathers.
